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 Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice? h e Hidden 
Stories Behind the Prosecution of 
Industrialists Post-WWII 
 Grietje   Baars * 
 (I)  Introduction 
 It is well known that in the ‘subsequent trials’ held in Nuremberg by the US mili-
tary, the directors of three of Germany’s largest industrial combines (and one bank) 
were prosecuted for their roles in the Nazis’ aggressive wars and the Holocaust. 
What has remained largely hidden is how the rapidly changing geopolitical land-
scape inl uenced the decision to try industrialists for their war responsibility, the 
articulation of the ‘economic case’ at the International Military Tribunal (IMT), 
the conduct of the industrialists’ trials at the US Military Tribunals at Nuremberg 
(NMT) and eventually the early release and rehabilitation of the convicted busi-
ness leaders. h e US and USSR had at one point both understood World War II 
(WWII) as a war of economic imperialism in which industrialists had played a 
key role—both in planning and waging. With the commencement of the Cold 
War this idea became a point of sharp ideological divide. h e economic story of 
WWII gradually moved over to ‘hidden history’ in the West, while remaining 
visible only in the German Democratic Republic and Soviet discourse. Likewise, 
the omission of  zaibatsu leaders from the Tokyo International Tribunal hid the 
Allies’ expressed conviction that also the war on the Eastern front had been one of 
economic imperialism. Over time, the way international conl ict is conceptualized 
and explained in mainstream Western (legal) discourse has changed, as has the 
role that international criminal law (ICL) is accorded in world politics, and whose 
 *  Drs (Utrecht), LLM (UCL), PhD (UCL), Lecturer (City University London, UK). h is chapter 
draws on my PhD, entitled ‘Law(yers) Congealing Capitalism: On the (Im)possibility of Restraining 
Business Involvement in Conl ict through International Criminal Law’ (2012), and specii cally, on 
research carried out during my time as a Visiting Researcher at Das Franz-von-Liszt-Institut for 
International Criminal Law, Humboldt University, Berlin (guest of Prof. Florian Jeßberger). I  am 
grateful to Catherine Redgwell, Kamil Majchrzak, Immi Tallgren, Ioannis Kalpouzos, Mark Kilian, 
Gerry Simpson, Kevin Jon Heller and all participants of the ‘Hidden Histories’ workshop for their 
comments and support. All errors and omissions are mine alone. 
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accountability is sought through ICL. Together, these facts rel ect capitalism’s hid-
den victor’s justice. 
 In contrast to mainstream liberal-legal and positivist accounts of ‘Nuremberg’, 1 
in this chapter I tell the story—in particular the specii c story of the ‘economic 
case’ and the industrialists—as situated in the material context and relations of 
the time. Doing so shows the direct ef ect of specii c turns of events not only on 
the legal processes, but also on how ICL was interpreted and applied. h rough a 
historical materialist reading of Nuremberg, we can explain, for example, how the 
NMT trials turned from an ostensible morality play to a performance of  théâtre 
de l’absurde . 
 It is hoped that through highlighting the processes and contradictions at 
Nuremberg this chapter will give impetus to investigating precisely how  current 
use of ICL also seeks to ‘spirit away’ economic causes of contemporary conl ict and 
thus forms an integral element of capitalist imperialism. 2 
 Section II begins with an examination of the Allied (ef ectively, US and USSR 3 ) 
consensus on the nature of WWII as imperialist, on the role of the industrialists in 
Hitler’s aggressive war, the formulation of the ‘economic case’ and the indictment, 
trial and judgment at the IMT. I tell this history focusing on the US perspective 
because the main international trial was very much a US-directed af air. 4 It served 
to simultaneously legitimize and showcase the US’s role as the rising hegemon of 
the ‘free world’. While the US leadership’s desire to prosecute industrialists and 
discipline the German economy played an instrumental role in its decision to hold 
subsequent trials at Nuremberg, 5 the appetite for this declined with the turna-
round in US foreign and economic policy that gradually materialized after WWII. 
Section III traces this turnaround—the start of the Cold War—and its impact on 
US political and economic involvement in Europe. In Section IV, I go on to show 
how this turnaround manifested itself in the conduct and outcomes of the trials 
 1  See, eg, those contained in  Guénaël  Mettraux ,  Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial ( Oxford :  Oxford 
University Press,  2008 ) . Among the of -mainstream accounts are,  Florian  Jeßberger ,  ‘Die I.G. Farben 
vor Gericht: Von den Ursprüngen eines “Wirtschaftsvölkerstrafrechts” ’ ,  Juristenzeitung ,  19 ( 2009 ), 
 924 ;  Florian  Jeßberger ,  ‘On the Origins of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under International 
Law for Business Activity: IG Farben on Trial’ ,  Journal of International Criminal Justice ,  8 ( 2010 ),  783 ; 
 J. A.  Bush ,  ‘h e Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What 
Nuremberg Really Said’ ,  Columbia Law Review ,  109 ( 2009 ) . 
 2  According to Arthur, the task of the legal academic ‘is that of tracing . . . both the relationships 
that are expressed in the legal superstructure and those that it ideologically spirits away’:  C.  Arthur , 
 ‘Introduction’ in  E.  Pashukanis ,  Law and Marxism:  A  General h eory ( London :   Ink Links, Ltd, 
 1978 ),  31 . 
 3  I use ‘US’, ‘USSR’ etc as shorthand for the leading members of the government at any given 
moment—in other words, the momentary ‘winners’ of the constant competition between various 
sectors of a state administration (for a similar approach, see  Nikolai  Bukharin ,  Imperialism and World 
Economy ( London :  Bookmarks,  2003 ),  137 ). 
 4  See, eg,  Telford  Taylor ,  Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir ( New York, NY :  Little, 
Brown & Company  1992 ),  634 and generally,  F.  Hirsch ,  ‘h e Soviets at Nuremberg: International 
Law, Propaganda and the Making of the Postwar Order’ ,  American Historical Review ,  113 ( 2008 ),  730 . 
 5  Taylor, above n 4, 161; Bush, above n 1, 1112–29;  Donald  Bloxham ,  Genocide on Trial: War 
Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press, 
 2001 ),  24 . 
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of the industrialists at Nuremberg. Section V compares the US trials to the largely 
forgotten post-WWII international trials of industrialists by the French, British 
and Soviet military tribunals, and with the decision of the Military Tribunal for 
the Far East not to indict Japanese  zaibatsu leaders. Finally, Section VI connects 
the aftermath of the trials, the ‘McCloy clemency’ and subsequent reinstatement 
of most of the industrialists to their former positions, with contemporary debates 
around ICL, the economic causes of conl ict and ‘corporate impunity’. 
 (II)  h e Economic Causes of WWII at the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
 h e ‘Trial of the Major War Criminals at Nuremberg’ commenced at a moment 
when the role of the German industrial combines in Hitler’s aggressive war was 
emphasised by US political leaders in public statements, declarations and reports. 
h e US leadership considered the aggressive, expansive war to have been orches-
trated by the ‘unholy trinity’ of corporatism, Nazism and militarism, 6 for the mar-
kets and resources of the neighbouring countries, and indeed, with the eventual 
aim of ‘world conquest’. 7 h e American administration had scrutinized the nature 
and activities of German industry in this respect since the beginning of the war. In 
his memoirs, Josiah Dubois (a State Department lawyer who was to become the 
lead prosecutor in the  IG Farben case) tells of travelling the Western Hemisphere 
with Bernard Bernstein of the Treasury Department in the early 1940s to seek out 
and freeze IG Farben’s i nancial interests. 8 h e German industrial and banking 
giants had been discussed in depth in the US Senate, for instance in the Kilgore 
Committee, and formed a major site of investigation for the Oi  ce of Strategic 
Services (OSS), the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. 9 German 
chemicals giant IG Farben appears to have been a main object of interest for the 
 6  Telford Taylor in  Flick , below n 51, 32. See also, Jackson's June 1945 Report—this report con-
tained the ‘basic features of the plan of prosecution’ written at the request of the US President by 
the (then) US Representative and Chief Counsel for War Crimes:  Justice Jackson’s Report to the 
President on Atrocities and War Crimes; 7 June 1945, available from Yale Law School,  h e Avalon 
Project:  Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy [website], < http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt_
jack01.asp >, (Jackson June 1945 Report) (accessed 27 February 2013). 
 7  h is view is expressed, for example, in the US Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Af airs, 
Cartel Practices and National Security, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on Military Af airs, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1944. Vol. 16; IG Farben Material Submitted by the War 
Department, 79th Cong. (1945) (Bernstein Farben Report), 941 and 953–57;  Christopher  Simpson 
(ed),  War Crimes of Dresdner and Deutsche Bank:  Oi  ce of the Military Government (US) Reports 
( Teaneck, NJ :  Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc .,  2001 ) (original report produced November 1946). 
 8  Josiah  Dubois ,  h e Devil’s Chemists:  24 Conspirators of the International Farben Cartel who 
Manufacture Wars ( Boston, MA :  h e Beacon Press,  1952 ),  14–15 . 
 9  See, eg, Oi  ce of the US Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Staf  Evidence 
Analysis (Gen. h omas), Fundaments for a History of the German War and Armament Economy 
(1944),  Cornell Donovan Archive, Vol. II, 6.15; Oi  ce of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis 
Branch, German Military Government over Europe:  Economic Controls in Occupied Europe, 
Washington 28 August 1945,  Cornell Donovan Archive , Vol. CVIII. 
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Americans. h e OSS investigated the concealment of ownership of IG Farben 
subsidiaries operating in Allied jurisdictions, the identity and role of the German 
bankers and i nanciers and the precise mechanisms of economic warfare employed 
by the Reich. 10 Intensive investigation into the global span of the IG Farben cartel 
led the US leadership to fear that German imperialism would not be coni ned 
to the European continent. 11 In 1945 the Congressional Subcommittee on War 
Mobilization, chaired by Senator Kilgore, heard evidence to the ef ect that one 
of Farben’s key objectives was to drive the US out of the European market. It also 
learnt how IG Farben managed to exclude US companies from acquiring necessary 
resources on the Latin American market and so signii cantly curbed US war pro-
duction and thus military potential. 12 h rough US subsidiaries, IG Farben gathered 
important intelligence on US war production and through ingenious patenting 
and subcontracting arrangements it excluded American industry from important 
military technologies. 13 h e US investigation found that, besides Standard Oil, 
dozens of US companies had agreements with IG Farben—and this was without 
counting Farben-owned subsidiaries. 14 Bernstein’s Farben Report quotes Farben 
witnesses who profess to have been fully aware of, and in complete agreement with, 
Hitler’s plans for aggressive war, with Farben director Von Schnitzler even going 
so far as to state ‘IG Farben [was] completely responsible for Hitler’s policy’. 15 As 
a household name, producing both Aspirin and Nylon stockings and present in 
every American home, Farben spoke to the imagination of the American public. 16 
h ere can be little doubt that this played a role in the US government’s later deci-
sion to prosecute the Farben directors. 
 Furthermore, the Finance Division of the Oi  ce of the Military Government of 
the US (OMGUS) (which had its headquarters in the former IG Farben complex 
in Frankfurt) produced a series of reports totalling over 10,000 pages detailing 
the investigations into German banks and other i nancial institutions. 17 Together, 
the sources paint a picture of highly sophisticated and ef ective economic warfare 
 10  See, eg, US Group CC/Finance Division, ‘Preliminary Report:  Concealment of Ownership 
of Some I.G. Farben Selling Companies’,  Cornell Donovan Archive , Vol. VII, Section 13.18. h e 
OSS investigation was led by Franz Leopold Neumann, a German intellectual and who had l ed to 
New York in the 1930s with other Frankfurt School members Otto Kirchheimer and Herbert Marcuse. 
His 1944 book  Behemoth: h e Structure and Practice of National Socialism served as the blueprint for 
the US leadership’s understanding of the Nazi ‘apparatus’ (Franz Leopold Neumann,  Behemoth: h e 
Structure and Practice of National Socialism (London: Octagon Books 1963)). Other US authors had 
also analysed—already during WWII—Germany’s ‘industrial of ensive’, see, eg,  Joseph  Borkin and 
 Charles  Welsh ,  Germany’s Master Plan: h e Story of Industrial Of ensive ( New York, NY :  Duell, Sloan 
and Pearce  1944 ) . Borkin was economic advisor to the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
in Washington (T. Arnold, ‘Introduction’, in Borkin and Welsh (eds),  Germany’s Master Plan , xvi), and 
responsible for this oi  ce’s investigation into IG Farben during WWII. See further  Joseph  Borkin ,  h e 
Crime and Punishment of IG Farben ( New York, NY :  h e Free Press,   1978 ) . 
 11  Donny  Gluckstein ,  A People’s History of the Second World War:  Resistance Versus Empire 
( London :  Pluto Press,  2012 ),  10 . 
 12  Bernstein Farben Report, above n 7, 947, 952; US Congress, Senate, Committee on Military 
Af airs, above n 7; 79th Cong. (1945), Part 10, IG Farben Exhibits (Kilgore Farben Exhibits). 
 13  Bernstein Farben Report, above n 7, 945.    14  Bernstein Farben Report, above n 7, 993. 
 15  Bernstein Farben Report, above n 7, 957.    16  Dubois, above n 8, 3. 
 17  Simpson, above n 7, 1. 
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carried out by the German industrial leaders in collusion with military and Nazi 
leaders. 18 h e Soviet leadership shared this understanding of imperialism; respon-
sible for WWII was a band of ‘ “unconscionable adventurers and criminals”—com-
prising the Nazi party and military leaders as well as the directors of the larger 
banks and corporations’. 19 h ere was broad agreement on the imperialist nature of 
Germany’s aggressive war and the role of the constellation Eisenhower was later to 
call ‘the military-industrial complex’. 20 With WWII typii ed as a quarrel between 
Allied and Axis governments about who should dominate the world economy, 21 
it appears Hitler’s economic objectives troubled the US and USSR more than the 
Holocaust and the other atrocities carried out by the Nazis. 22 
 In a number of places this US/USSR meeting of minds led to concrete articu-
lation and action. 23 Among the sites where the Allies’ understanding of the eco-
nomic causes of the war were clearly articulated and responded to was the Potsdam 
Agreement. 24 h is agreement, concluded on 2 August 1945 by the USSR, USA, 
and UK leaderships, de facto incorporated the ‘Morgenthau Plan’—the plan for 
a pastoralized Germany drawn up by US Secretary of State Henry Morgenthau. 25 
h e Potsdam Agreement stipulated the destruction of Germany’s future war poten-
tial through the ‘decartellization’: breaking up of the main German cartels through 
expropriation of physical property but also share ownership including ownership 
of foreign subsidiaries of German companies, demolition of factories and ship-
ping of  of heavy machinery to the Allies in the form of reparations in kind. 26 
Signii cant parts of the Potsdam Agreement were carried out by the US and other 
 18  Some authors follow an ‘agency theory’ approach to argue that Hitler was a mere puppet in the 
employ of German industrialists but the better view is one of control by the German elites from 
all three sectors, which, particularly after the ‘nazii cation’ of industrial leadership and according 
of military ranks to industrialists, became di   cult to distinguish clearly and can be said to have 
formed a ‘state-capitalist trust’ (see, eg, Bukharin, above n 3, 127). For an overview of theories of ‘war 
responsibility’ between ‘primacy of politics’ and ‘primacy of economics’ see  Norbert  Frei and  Tim 
 Schanetzky (eds),  Unternehmen im Nationalsozialismus: Zur historisierung einer Forschungskonjunktur 
( Göttingen :  Wallstein Verlag,   2010 ) . 
 19  Jörg Osterloh, ‘Die Monopole und ihre Herren:  Marxistische Interpretationen’, in Frei and 
Schanetzky, above n 18, 36 (my translation). 
 20  Eisenhower farewell address (17 January 1961), Press release containing the text of the address, 
 Dwight D. Eisenhower: Presidential Library and Museum [website], < http://www.eisenhower.archives.
gov/research/online_documents/farewell_address.html > (accessed 26 February 2013). 
 21  Indeed, ‘the belief of ordinary people, that the issue was fascism versus anti-fascism, was largely 
irrelevant for rulers on both sides of the Axis/Allied divide’: Gluckstein, above n 11, 9. 
 22  Bloxham, above n 5, 57–90;  Kevin Jon  Heller ,  h e Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins 
of International Criminal Law ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press,  2011 ),  4 . 
 23  See, eg, Section V of the Yalta (Crimea) Conference Agreement reached on 11 February 1945 
between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, published in  A Decade of American Foreign Policy:  Basic 
Documents, 1941–49 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Oi  ce, 1950). 
 24  Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 between the USSR, the USA and the UK (Potsdam 
Agreement): Yale Law School,  h e Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy [website], 
< http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp > (accessed 27 February 2013). 
 25  Hans  Morgenthau ,  Germany is Our Problem ( New York, NY :  Harper & Brothers,   1945 ) . 
 26  Potsdam Agreement, Part IIB (Article 12) and Part III. 
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Allied occupation authorities in Germany. 27 In the Eastern Soviet Occupation 
Zone most industries were nationalized. 28 
 In the execution of the plan, ‘Morgenthau Boys’—young German-speaking 
mainly Jewish men who had l ed to the US during the war—were deployed to 
Germany by OMGUS to investigate the state of industry after the war, and to 
interview the key industrialists in each sector. 29 In the immediate post-war period 
hundreds of industrialists were interned by the Allies, with the British for example 
detaining 120 business leaders in the banking, chemical, electrical and automobile 
sectors from the Ruhr area in the autumn of 1945. 30 
 It is in this context, where the emphasis was on disabling Germany’s potential 
as a competing empire, that the US and the other Allies decided to hold an inter-
national trial at Nuremberg. 
 (1)  h e IMT and the ‘economic case’ 
 h e international trial to be held at the IMT formed a cornerstone of the Allies’ 
post-WWII policy. It was the main public spectacle, or ‘morality play’, aimed at 
justifying the sacrii ce of Allied manpower and resources. It also papered over the 
Allies’ own failure to act sooner and more ef ectively against aggressive Nazism, to 
stop the Holocaust and also its failures with regard to Jewish refugees. 31 Moreover, 
the role of ‘Nuremberg’ was to help establish US moral authority as the rising 
superpower. 32 Henry Stimson, who is credited as the main driver for trials within 
the US government, ‘saw the moralist agenda of outlawing war as one way to 
ensure greater security for an American-dominated economic empire’. 33 To 
achieve this objective, the main international trial at Nuremberg had to produce 
an historical record of war responsibility. 34 h ere was to be an emphasis on the 
 27  See, eg, the Military Government of Germany, ‘Control of IG Farben’, in  Special Report of 
Military Governor US Zone (1 October 1945) which details the measures taken to disable Farben’s 
‘war potential’. 
 28  A.  Hilger ,  ‘Die Gerechtigkeit nehme ihren Lauf ’? Die Bestrafung deutscher Kriegs—und 
Gewaltverbrecher in der Sowjetunion und der SBZ/DDR’ , in  Norbert  Frei (ed),  Transnationale 
Vergangenheitspolitik:  Der Umgang mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechern in Europa nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg ( Göttingen :  Wallstein Verlag,  2006 ),  180 . 
 29  K. Majchrzak, interview with Peter Weiss, 12 October 2008, Berlin. Peter Weiss, now 
Vice-President of Board of the Centre for Constitutional Rights in New York, in this interview relates 
his own experience as one of the ‘Morgenthau Boys’. 
 30  Tim  Schanetzky ,  ‘Unternehmer: Proi teure des Unrechts’ , in  Norbert  Frei (ed),  Hitlers Eliten nach 
1945 ( Munich :  Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag,  2003 ),  74 . 
 31  Richard D.  McKinzie, interview with Josiah E.  Dubois, 29 June 1973, Camden, NJ:   Harry 
S.  Truman Library and Museum [website], < http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/duboisje.htm > 
(accessed 27 February 2013) (Dubois Interview). 
 32  Elizabeth  Borgwardt ,  A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights ( Cambridge, 
MA :   h e Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,  2005 ) . Cf.  Martii  Koskenniemi ,  ‘Between 
Impunity and Show Trials’ ,  Max Planck UNYB ,  6 ( 2002 ),  10 . 
 33  Borgwardt, above n 33, 75. 
 34  Famously, Robert Jackson, IMT Opening Address,  International Military Tribunal, h e Trial of 
German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany 
(commencing 20 November 1945). 
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totality of the war rather than on the detail. 35 Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson 
stated:
 Our case against the major defendants is concerned with the Nazi master plan, not with 
individual barbarities and perversions which occurred independently of any central plan. 
h e groundwork of our case must be factually authentic and constitute a well-documented 
history of what we are convinced was a grand, concerted pattern to incite and commit the 
aggressions and barbarities which have shocked the world. 36 
 What became known as the ‘economic case’ was included as part of the over-
arching conspiracy charge. h e Soviets agreed with the US on the importance of 
holding individuals responsible for aggressive war. 37 h e shared understanding of 
the nature and causes of WWII as described above persisted at the IMT trial. h e 
‘ Leitmotif of the IMT trial was exposing Nazism, militarism, economic imperial-
ism in an “orgy of revelation” ’. 38 
 In the US’s oi  cial view, what had enabled WWII to be started, and thus all its 
atrocities to be committed, had been the ‘captur[e of ] the form of the German 
state as an instrumentality for spreading their [Nazi] rule to other countries’. 39 h is 
was to be rel ected in the choice of defendants:
 Whom will we accuse and put to their defence? We will accuse a large number of individu-
als and oi  cials who were in authority in the government, in the military establishment, 
including the General Staf , and in the i nancial, industrial and economic life in Germany 
who by all civilised standards are provable to be common criminals. 40 
 h e Soviet representative at Nuremberg, Aron Trainin stated that the industrial-
ists and i nanciers’ ‘political position is clear: these were the masters for whom the 
Fascist State machine was zealously working’, adding, ‘the German i nancial and 
industrial heads must also be sent for trial as criminals’. 41 
 From the very start it was clear that the ‘economic case’—the part of the pros-
ecution dealing with the economic causes of, and motivations for, the war and 
the responsibility of economic actors and policy-makers—would be key in the 
Nuremberg Trial. 42 Frankfurt School intellectual Franz Neumann was employed 
by the prosecution team, and his book  Behemoth:  h e Structure and Practice of 
 35  A delicate balance had to be drawn between showing the barbarity of the Nazis and retaining pop-
ular support for the trial. h e i lm made about the trial,  Nuremberg: Its Lessons for Today , was prevented 
from being i nished and shown in the US, apparently because it was feared it would af ect popular 
support also for the Marshall Plan (below). h e i lm was recently i nished: Schulberg Productions and 
Metropolis Productions,  Nuremberg: Its Lessons for Today [website], < http://www.nurembergi lm.org/ > 
(accessed 27 February 2013). 
 36  Jackson Negotiations Report, Part III, above n 6. 
 37  Hirsch, above n 4, 701. See also,  Franz Leopold  Neumann ,  ‘h e War Crimes Trials’ ,  World 
Politics ,  2 ( 1949 ),  135 , 139 . 
 38  Bloxham, above n 5, 203. 
 39  Jackson Negotiations Report, Part III, above n 6. 
 40  Jackson Negotiations Report, Part III, above n 6. 
 41  Aron Naumovich  Trainin ( Andrey Yanuaryevich  Vishinksi , ed),  Hitlerite Responsibility under 
Criminal Law ( London :  Hutchinson & Co. Ltd,  1945 ),  84 ,  85 . 
 42  See, eg, Bush, above n 1, 1110–15. 
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National Socialism —which emphasized the role of economic actors in causing 
WWII—was a must-read for Nuremberg prosecutors. 43 h e leading defendant at the 
IMT was Hermann Göring, Hitler’s second-in-command, who had been in charge of 
readying the German economy for war. For the US prosecution, the key issue to be 
addressed was ‘the Nazi plan to dominate the world and to wage aggressive war’, 44 as 
had been partly discovered through the Kilgore Farben investigations. 
 When Justice Jackson and his staf  commenced work in preparation for the trial, 
four indictment-drafting committees were established each dealing with a dif erent 
core aspect of the war for which charges were to be brought. Committee One (Britain) 
dealt with the aggressive war charge; Committee Two (USSR) with war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in the East; and Committee h ree (France) with equivalent 
crimes in the West. h e Americans would prepare the ‘common plan and conspiracy’ 
charge. 45 h e latter charge was to cover the pre-WWII story of Nazism, Hitler’s sei-
zure and exploitation of power, his plans and steps to occupy much of Europe, and 
his design to attack the United States. As the i rst count of the indictment, it would 
comprise the basic narrative of the case as a whole. 46 h is committee was headed by 
Justice Jackson himself. As a vital part of this charge, the ‘economic case’ was entrusted 
to American lawyer Frank Shea. 47 Shea produced a memorandum in which he pro-
posed for prosecution Hjalmar Schacht (former head of the Reichsbank and Minister 
of Economics, who had provided the i nancing for war production), Fritz Sauckel (a 
primary i gure in the foreign forced labour programme), Albert Speer (an architect 
and later Minister of Armaments and Munitions), Walter Funk (Schacht’s successor) 48 
as well as Alfried Krupp and six other German industrial and i nancial leaders. Shea 
considered the guilt of the industrialists and i nanciers lay in the fact that ‘they had 
given Hitler the material means to rearm Germany,  with full knowledge that Hitler 
planned to use these armaments to carry out a program of German aggrandizement 
by military conquest’. 49 
 From the mid-1930s the German economy had been geared towards heavy 
industry, which comprised the mining of coal (Germany’s main natural resource) 
and the manufacture of iron and steel products. h ese industries were controlled 
by small number of large industrial and mining combines including Krupp, Flick, 
h yssen, the state-owned Reich-Werks-Hermann-Göring and IG Farben. By a law 
of 15 May 1933, individual enterprises were compulsorily combined into cartels, 
while by a law of 30 January 1937, enterprises with a capital of less than 100,000 
marks were subject to liquidation, and henceforth only companies with a capital 
of not less than 500,000 marks were permitted. 50 h e concentration of capital in 
fewer hands gave rise to a powerful group of i nancial and industrial magnates. 51 
 43  Above n 7, and Bush, above n 1, 1108, fn 36.    44  Bloxham, above n 5, 6. 
 45  Taylor, above n 4, 79–80.    46  Taylor, above n 4, 80. 
 47  Taylor, above n 4, 90–2.    48  Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I, Ch. VIII. 
 49  Taylor, above n 4, 81 (emphasis in original). 
 50  Trainin, above n 41, 83. 
 51  United States v Friedrich Flick et al ( Flick ), US Military Tribunal Nuremberg,  Judgment of 20 
August 1947, in  Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council 
Law No. 10 , Vol. VI, Prosecution Opening Statement, 35–6. 
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 Other aspects of the ‘economic case’ in the IMT Indictment included war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. Göring and the other defendants had to a greater or 
lesser extent been involved in the ‘aryanization’ of industries in the occupied coun-
tries in the expansion of the German  Lebensraum . h is involved the expropriation 
of foreign businesses and resources, as well as the recruitment and deployment of 
around i ve million slave labourers, part of whom had been work-to-death labour 
supplied by the Nazi extermination camps. 52 
 h e economic case gathered criticism from the start, with one critic arguing it 
was not the US’s job to ‘reform European economics’ or ‘turn a war crimes trial into 
an anti-trust case’. 53 h e gradual change in attitude vis-á-vis Nuremberg must be 
seen in the context of the change in US leadership at this crucial time. On 12 May 
1945 Roosevelt died and was succeeded by Truman—a more business-oriented 
leader:
 Of the 125 most important government appointments made by President Truman in the 
i rst two post-war years, 49 were bankers, i nanciers and industrialists, 31 were military 
men and 17 lawyers, mostly with Big Business connections. h e ef ective locus of govern-
ment seemed to shift from Washington to some place equidistant between Wall Street and 
West Point. 54 
 h e prosecution list was whittled down to twenty-four defendants. 55 In relation 
to the ‘economic case’, only the former ministers Sauckel, Funk and Speer were 
indicted, with Schacht, the ‘redoubtable banker’ 56 and Krupp as the sole industri-
alist, despite the fact that the prosecution teams, supported by OMGUS staf , had 
gathered much evidence to support the ‘economic case’. 57 
 h e retention of Krupp, the ‘main organiser of German industry’, in the indict-
ment made him the  pars pro toto for German industry. However, there was disa-
greement among the dif erent teams of lawyers working on the indictment as to 
whether Gustav Krupp, the man who had run the Krupp concern until 1941, or 
Alfried Krupp, his son, who had been the company’s executive director before 
becoming sole owner in 1943, was the intended defendant. Eventually, Gustav the 
elder was selected, but his British captors, by way of a ‘catastrophic blunder’, failed 
to discover until days before the trial was to commence that he was—at 80 years 
of age—too ill and demented to stand trial. 58 h e US immediately requested the 
court replace Gustav with his son Alfried on the indictment. h e prosecution of at 
least one Krupp family member was in the public interest, explained in the words 
of Justice Jackson:
 h e Krupp inl uence was powerful in promoting the Nazi plan to incite aggressive warfare 
in Europe. Krupps were thus one of the most persistent and inl uential forces that made this 
 52  Oi  ce of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, I  Nazi Conspiracy 
and Aggression 349 (1946), esp. ‘Chapter VIII—Economic Aspects of the Conspiracy’ (Economic 
Aspects). 
 53  Taylor, above n 4, 81. 
 54  Howard K.  Smith ,  h e State of Europe ( New York, NY :  Knopf,  1949 ),  83 ,  95 . 
 55  Partly also due to British ef orts to keep the list short and the trial brief (Taylor, above n 4, 90). 
 56  Taylor, above n 4, 591.    57  Economic Aspects, above n 53.    58  Taylor, above n 4, 630. 
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war . . . Once the war was on, Krupps, both Von Bohlen and Alfried being directly respon-
sible therefor, led German industry in violating treaties and international law by employ-
ing enslaved labourers, impressed and imported from nearly every country occupied by 
Germany . . . Moreover, the Krupp companies proi ted greatly from destroying the peace of 
the world through support of the Nazi program . . . h e United States respectfully submits 
that no greater disservice to the future peace of the world could be done than to excuse the 
entire Krupp family. 59 
 h e request was rejected. Apparently the British objected on the grounds that 
allowing it would delay the start of the trial. 60 Although what might have been 
the i rst ever international trial of an industrialist was thus curtailed, its shadow 
was still present at Nuremberg. h e IMT decided against formally trying Krupp 
 in absentia , but  did retain the charges against him in the indictment, 61 which were 
read out in court on the i rst day of the trial. Moreover, the case against Krupp 
was still explicitly made, for example in the US Prosecution team’s presentation on 
Count One on day four of the trial. 62 
 In addition, the economic case more generally featured prominently in the evi-
dence presented by the US team at Nuremberg. Prosecutor Sidney Alderman, for 
example, presenting on the aggressive war charge cited the ‘Hossbach Notes’ in 
evidence to show that Hitler himself had also conceptualized the war as one of 
economic imperialism—the objective was conquest of a sui  cient living space for 
food production for the German people plus the dominance of global trade and 
commerce. 63 
 Where the trial had focused on Göring’s role as, ‘in theory and in practice . . . the 
economic dictator of the Reich’, 64 the IMT Judgment illustrates this role while 
strongly implicating the absent industrialists. h e judges recount how, in November 
1932, a petition signed by leading industrialists and i nanciers had been presented 
to President Hindenburg, calling upon him to entrust the Chancellorship to 
Hitler. 65 Subsequently, according to evidence submitted to the Tribunal:
 59  Answer of the United States Prosecution to the Motion on Behalf of Defendant Gustav Von 
Krupp Von Bohlen, 12 November 1945,  Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , 134f . 
 60  Order of the Tribunal Rejecting the Motion to amend the Indictment, dated 15 November 1945, 
in I TWC, 146, and see, Memorandum of the British Prosecution on the motion, in I  Trials of War 
Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , 139. h ey had 
promised instead to cooperate on a second international trial in which Krupp could be tried ( Donald 
 Bloxham ,  Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory 
( Oxford :  Oxford University Press,  2003 ),  24 ). 
 61  Indictment of the International Military Tribunal, I  h e Trial of German Major War Criminals by 
the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany 27, 1947 (IMT Indictment). 
 62  Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Volume II, Day Four—Continuation of Colonel Storey’s 
Presentation on Count 1, 222–3 and see the underlying prosecution i le, a summary of which is pub-
lished in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 2, Chapter XVI, Part 13. 
 63  Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Volume II, Day Five—Sidney Alderman’s Presentation on 
Aggressive War, 261–5. 
 64  IMT Judgment in International Military Tribunal, Judgment of 1 October 1946, in I  h e Trial 
of German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany 
171, 1947 (IMT Judgment), 183. 
 65  IMT Judgment, 177. 
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 On the invitation of Goering, approximately 25 of the leading industrialists of Germany, 
together with Schacht, attended a meeting in Berlin on 20 February 1933. h is was shortly 
before the German election of 5 March 1933. At this meeting Hitler announced the con-
spirators’ aim to seize totalitarian control over Germany, to destroy the parliamentary sys-
tem, to crush all opposition by force, and to restore the power of the Wehrmacht. Among 
those present at that meeting were Gustav Krupp, four leading oi  cials of the I.G. Farben 
Works, one of the world’s largest chemical concerns; Albert Vogler, head of United Steel 
Works of Germany; and other leading industrialists. 66 
 At this meeting, Göring opened an election fund (into which the industrialists 
contributed) to support Hitler in the March elections. Göring predicted these 
elections would be Germany’s last. 67 
 A month after the meeting between Göring and the industrialists, Krupp 
submitted to Hitler—on behalf of the Reich Association of German Industry—a 
plan for the reorganization of German industry. Krupp is cited in the Judgment as 
having stated that the plan was ‘characterised by the desire to coordinate economic 
measures and political necessity’, and that ‘the turn of political events is in line 
with the wishes which I myself and the board of directors have cherished for a long 
time’. 68 h e industrialists’ plan was adopted. 69 
 So while the US administration’s support for the economic case waned, its legal 
oi  cers still followed through on the initial sentiment. h e IMT Judgment 
surmised, ‘[i] n this reorganization of the economic life of Germany for military 
purposes, the Nazi Government found the German armament industry quite will-
ing to co-operate’. 70 Moreover, the Judgment related how industrialists picked the 
rich fruits of aggressive war and participated directly in the Holocaust. h is was 
exemplii ed by Krupp’s extensive use of slave labour at his plant in Essen, where 
‘punishments of the most cruel kind were inl icted on the workers’. 71 
 h e lingering wish (strongest among the US Prosecution team) to actually 
prosecute industrialists became one of the reasons the US went ahead with the 
‘subsequent proceedings’ at the NMT. 72 Both Robert Jackson and his successor 
as Chief Prosecutor, Telford Taylor, pushed hard for the opportunity to try rep-
resentatives of all sections of the German elite, including members of relevant 
professional groups, including the industrialists. However, by now the tide was 
irrepressibly turning, and the US lawyers started to face more resistance from 
the US government—supported in this respect by the increasingly hostile home 
media. 73 
 66  Economic Aspects, above n 52. 
 67  IMT Judgment, above n 64, 184. Schacht was acquitted (Soviet judge Nikitchenko dissenting), as 
the Court found his knowledge of an impending aggressive war not proven beyond reasonable doubt 
(IMT Judgment, above n 64, 506–7). On the impact of Schacht’s acquittal on the industrialists’ cases, 
see Bush, above n 1, 1124. 
 68  IMT Judgment, above n 64, 183.    69  Economic Aspects, above n 52. 
 70  IMT Judgment, above n 64, 419.    71  IMT Judgment, above n 64, 462. 
 72  Above n 8; Bush above n 1, 1239. 
 73  See, eg,  Donald  Bloxham ,  ‘British War Crimes Trial Policy in Germany, 1945–
1957: Implementation and Collapse’ ,  Journal of British Studies ,  42 ( 2003 ),  97 . 
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 (III)  h e Turnaround: From Germany is our Problem 
to Germany is our Business 
 In the spring of 1947 clearer signs started appearing of a changing Allied policy 
towards Germany, from one where Germany was to be publicly castigated and 
disabled (in trials and through economic policies as envisaged in the Morgenthau 
Plan) to one where Germany was to be rehabilitated into the world community 
of states and its economy rebuilt. 74 Here I focus on how this change (ef ectively, 
the start of the Cold War) was rel ected in the US leadership’s decision-making 
regarding the industrialists’ trials, and subsequently (Section IV) on the clearly 
perceptible impact it had in the proceedings and the decisions of the tribunals. 
 Individual members of the US administration disagreed strongly on appro-
priate US policy towards Germany. 75 Morgenthau relates how already during 
WWII orders were given to the military to spare German industrial plants. 76 
In his memoirs, Dubois describes a secret State Department memorandum set-
ting out its ‘post-war program’ relating to in kind reparations payments from 
Germany. 77 Such reparations could form a public justii cation for sparing, and 
where necessary rebuilding, Germany’s productive capacity, as well as retain-
ing US-German trade ties. However, the programme remained secret as at that 
point public and key political support was still behind the pacii c, ‘pastoral-
ized’ Germany as proposed in Morgenthau’s plan. Morgenthau, sensing support 
for his plan waning, reinforced his stance by publishing it as a book entitled 
 Germany is our Problem . 78 
 Over time, however, Morgenthau lost ground. 79 Dubois tells of seeing a second 
secret memorandum, circulated within the US delegation at Potsdam. According 
to this memo, the US goal now was ‘rebuilding a strong Germany as a buf er 
against Communism’. 80 While the Potsdam Agreement (and occupation directive 
JCS1067, on which much of Potsdam was based) 81 mirrored the Morgenthau Plan, 
Dubois states, ‘of course, it was never followed through. h e US oi  cials did do just 
 74  See generally,  John  Gimbel ,  ‘On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement: An Essay on 
U.S. Postwar German Policy’ ,  Political Science Quarterly ,  87 ( 1972 ),  242–69 . 
 75  Generally, see Gimbel, above n 74. According to Maguire, the US Nuremberg Prosecution staf  
‘included a disproportionate number of Harvard Law School graduates, former New Dealers, and 
liberal democrats’:  Peter  Maguire ,  Law and War: International Law and American History ( New York, 
NY :  Columbia University Press,  2010 ),  117 . 
 76  H.  Schild (ed),  Das Morgenthau Tagebuch—Dokumente des Anti-Germanismus ( Leoni am 
Starnberger See :  Druf el Verlag,  1970 ),  64 . 
 77  Dubois Interview, above n 31, 13.    78  Morgenthau, above n 25; Schild, above n 76, 64. 
 79  Exceptions made to Law No.56 to allow for the rehabilitation of German industry are 
detailed in:  Oi  ce of the Military Government for Germany (US),  Special Report of the Military 
Governor: Ownership and Control of the Ruhr Industries, November 1948. 
 80  Dubois Interview, above n 31, 34. 
 81  Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military 
Government of Germany, April 1945 (JCS1067);  US Department of State,  Foreign Relations of 
the United States: European Advisory Commission: Austria, Germany , Vol. III ( Washington DC :   US 
Government Printing Oi  ce  1945 ),  484 ; and generally, Dubois Interview, above n 31. 
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what Morgenthau was afraid of, and in ef ect what the State Department memo-
randum recommended’. 82 A strong, indentured economy was more attractive than 
a pastoralized state. Shortly after Potsdam Morgenthau was ‘in ef ect . . . i red by 
Truman’. 83 
 h e turnaround was not complete at this point, though, and elements of the plan 
persisted for some time. For example, the work of the OMGUS Decartelization 
Branch—staf ed by, the ‘Morgenthau Boys’ 84 —continued for two years after Henry 
Morgenthau’s departure. Many items of machinery were shipped to the United 
States and the other Allies by way of reparations payment. h e IG Farben Control 
Commission, which was run by all four occupation powers, split the Farben cartel 
into forty-seven parts, including the four sections that had only come together 
years before: Hoechst, Agfa, Bayer and BASF. 85 h e entire German economy came 
to be strictly controlled by the occupation authorities. OMGUS passed anti-cartel 
laws that considered any enterprise with more than 10,000 employees prima facie 
in violation. 86 Secret programmes were underway to control and harvest German 
scientii c development. h ousands of industrial patents, as well as hundreds of 
scientists were transferred to the US in ‘Operation Paperclip’. 87 
 h e ‘Restatement of Policy on Germany’ was US Secretary of State James Byrnes’ 
public announcement of the turnaround on 6 September 1946. In his speech, 
Byrnes raised the issue of the political and economic future of Europe: ‘Germany 
is a part of Europe and recovery in Europe, and particularly in the states adjoin-
ing Germany, will be slow indeed if Germany with her great resources of iron 
and coal is turned into a poorhouse’. 88 In this statement Byrnes ef ectively echoed 
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov’s speech on Germany’s economic future at the 
Paris Peace Conference in July 1946. However, unlike Molotov, Byrnes omitted 
mention of the industrialists’ role in WWII, a notion that by then was starting to 
disappear from ‘Western’ discourse, and would disappear all but completely after 
the subsequent trials. 89 
 In March 1947 Truman announced the ‘Truman Doctrine’ promising economic 
support to those ‘states resisting attempted subjugation’ (read: to communism). 90 
Soviet representative Zhdanov responded with the ‘two camps’ speech in which 
he repeated the view that capitalist imperialism, personii ed in the directors of 
 82  Dubois Interview, above n 31, 32, 33. 
 83  J.  Blum (ed),  From the Morgenthau Diaries , Vol. 3 ( Boston, MA :  Houghton Mil  in  1967 ),  400–
20 ,  451 ; Dubois Interview, above n 31, 25. 
 84  Richard D. McKinzie, interview with Bernard Bernstein, 23 July 1975, New York, NY:  Harry 
S.  Truman Library and Museum [website], < http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/bernsten.htm > 
(accessed 27 February 2013); Bernstein Farben Report, above n 7. 
 85  ‘Control of IG Farben’,  Special Report , above n 27.    86  Special Report , above n 85. 
 87  Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group,  Final 
Report to the United States Congress , April 2007. 
 88  US Department of State,  Documents on Germany 1944–1985 ( Washington DC :  Department of 
State,  1985 ),  91–9 . 
 89  Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich  Molotov ,  Speeches of V.M. Molotov, Minister for Foreign Af airs of the 
USSR and Head of the Soviet Delegation at the Conference ( London :  Soviet News,   1946 ) . 
 90  John  Merriman ,  A History of Modern Europe , Vols. 1 & 2 ( New York, NY : 3rd edn,  W.W. Norton 
& Co  2009 ),  119 . 
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the cartels, was the true perpetrator of WWII. 91 By this point hunger was wide-
spread in Germany 92 and there was real fear Germans would turn to communism. 
Acheson remarked that the US was at ‘the point where we see clearly how short 
is the distance from food and fuel either to peace or to anarchy’. 93 In July 1947 
JCS1067 was replaced with JCS1779, which codii ed the turn in US policy and 
stated that ‘[a] n orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions 
of a stable and productive Germany’. 94 German and generally Western European 
recovery took of , largely through the Marshall Plan announced on 5 June 1947, 95 
which aimed to modernize Western European industry and remove barriers to 
trade among European countries and between Europe and the US. 96 According to 
the US leadership, the objective of the Marshall Plan was only in part humanitar-
ian—rather, it was ‘chiel y . . . a matter of national self-interest’. 97 h e Plan both 
stimulated the dollar and US industry and services (as the aid largely took the form 
of i nancing of purchases to be made from US corporations) and provided leverage 
for building ‘political and economic stability’. 98 For example, Marshall Aid was 
used to pressure French and Italian governments not to appoint communists to 
ministerial posts. 99 Combining this with a leadership position in the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and 
the nascent international trade regime, the US was able to remake the economic 
coni guration of the world in its image. 100 
 When Marshall presented Molotov at the Paris Economic Conference with 
a plan to stimulate only agricultural development in Eastern Europe, Molotov 
walked out of the meeting in one of the i rst major public clashes of the Cold 
War. On the Eastern side, the Cominform, the coordinating mechanism for all 
communist parties, was inaugurated in September 1947 as the successor to the 
Comintern, and Zhdanow was installed as its chair. Zhdanow also expressed 
opposition to the Marshall Plan, which to communists (in Western and Eastern 
Europe alike) enabled American imperialism through the medium of US 
 91  H.  Wentker ,  Die juristische Aufarbeitung von NS-Verbrechen in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone 
und in der DDR ( Baden-Baden :  Kritische Justiz,  2002 ),  63 . 
 92  Lucius  Clay ,  Decision in Germany ( London :  William Heinemann,  1950 ),  262–84 . 
 93  D. Acheson, ‘h e Requirements of Reconstruction’, address made before Delta Council 
at Cleveland, MS on 8 May 1947,  Department of State Bulletin (18 May 1947), 992 (Acheson 
Reconstruction). 
 94  Directive to the Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation of Germany (JCS 
1779), Germany 1947–1949, 33–41,  Department of State Bulletin (27 July 27 1947), 186–93. 
 95  G. Marshall, ‘European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery’, remarks by the Secretary of 
State at Harvard University on 5 June 1947,  Department of State Bulletin (15 June 1947). 
 96  Merriman, above n 90, 1120–1.    97  Acheson Reconstruction, above n 93, 992. 
 98  Acheson Reconstruction, above n 93, 992–3.    99  Merriman, above n 90, 1120. 
 100  See  Ernest  Mandel ,  h e Meaning of the Second World War ( New  York, NY :   Verso,  1986 ), at 
 168 : ‘US imperialism could restrain itself because it had a way out economically. h e option it chose 
in 1946–48 was to concentrate its ef orts on the political and economic consolidation of capitalism 
in the main imperialist countries, and to grant them sui  cient credit and space for development to 
initiate a world-wide expansion of the capitalist economy, on the basis of which capitalism would be 
politically and socially stabilised in its main fortresses.’ 
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corporations. 101 Soviet power in Eastern Europe grew as Soviet troops took con-
trol of the Czech government in January 1948 and in June 1948 blocked foreign 
trains and truck routes into Berlin, in protest against US, British and French 
plans for a self-governing Western German zone. h e latter sent shockwaves 
through the US trial teams at Nuremberg and some made the decision to take 
their families home. 102 West German commentator Friedhelm Kröll summarizes 
the  Umorientierung (turnaround) as follows: ‘With the re-formation of political 
camps during the Cold War and the open warfare in Korea, the involvement of 
the young Federal Republic into the Western alliance weighed heavier than crime 
and punishment of Nazi crimes.’ 103 East German commentators accused the US 
of ‘liquidating Potsdam’. 104 
 It is against this backdrop that we must imagine the ef orts of US lawyers such 
as Jackson and Taylor to persuade the US political leadership to allow further tri-
als. 105 h at these took place at all can partly be brought down to the tenacity of 
these lawyers. 106 Justice Jackson, in his report on the IMT Judgment, reminded the 
US government that:
 h e war crimes work that remains to be done, is to deal with the very large number of 
Germans who have participated in the crimes [and who] remain unpunished. h ere are 
many industrialists, militarists, politicians, diplomats, and police oi  cials whose guilt does 
not dif er from those who have been convicted except that their parts were at lower levels 
and have been less conspicuous. 107 
 Jackson noted that his successor, Brigadier General Telford Taylor, had already 
‘prepared a programme of prosecutions against representatives of all the important 
segments of the h ird Reich including a considerable number of industrialists and 
i nanciers, leading cabinet ministers, top SS and police oi  cials, and militarists’. 108 
h e initial proposal had been for a second international trial. 109 British Foreign 
Secretary Orme Sargeant, however, feared that such a trial would become a ‘battle 
 101  United States Economic Cooperation Administration,  A Report on Recovery Progress and United 
States Aid (February 1949), 142–4 and generally, Chapter VI: ‘Communist Opposition to the ERP’, 
141–50. 
 102  Dubois, above n 8, 338. 
 103  Friedhelm  Kröll ,  ‘Fall 10: Der Krupp-Prozess’ , in  G. and  R.  Blasius (eds),  Der Nationalsozialismus 
vor Gericht: Die alliierten Prozesse gegen Kriegsverbrechen und Soldaten 1943–1952 ( Frankfurt :  Fischer 
Taschenbuch Verlag,  1999 ),  176 . 
 104  S.  Kahn ,  ‘Preface’ , in  Richard  Sasuly ,  IG Farben ( Berlin :  Volk und Welt,  1952 ),  6 . 
 105  On US domestic opposition to trying Nazis, see Maguire, above n 75, 119–20; Bush, above n 
1, 1230–1. 
 106  Bloxham, above n 60, 55. 
 107  ‘Jackson Report to the President of October 7’, 1946, attached to  Report of Robert H. Jackson, 
United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials (London, 1945) (Jackson 
Final Report). 
 108  Jackson Final Report, 435. 
 109  Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trial 
Under Control Council Law No. 10 (Washington, DC:  US Government Printing Oi  ce, 1949), 
22–7. For Jackson’s view on international versus US military trials, see Jackson Final Report, above 
n 108. For commentary see Heller, above n 22, 9–24; Bush, above n 1, 1123–9;  Donald  Bloxham , 
 “h e Trial that Never Was”: Why h ere Was No Second International Trial of Major War Criminals 
at Nuremberg’ ,  J. Hist. Ass’n ,  87 ( 2002 ),  46–7 . 
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between capitalism and communism’. 110 Jackson’s response shows industrialists 
were the prime target of further trials: ‘[I] f [the other Allies] were unwilling to take 
the additional time necessary to try industrialists in this case . . . [t]he quickest and 
most satisfactory results will be obtained, in my opinion, from immediate com-
mencement of our own cases according to plans which General Taylor has worked 
out’. 111 h is is what happened. 
 In the trials of the industrialists at the US NMT we can see the change in 
the broader geopolitical landscape and US attitude rel ected. On a very practical 
level, for example, General Clay was ordered by JCS1779 to ‘make every ef ort to 
facilitate and bring to early completion the war crimes program’. 112 In 1947 he 
put direct pressure on Taylor to wrap up the NMT trials—before they had even 
begun. 113 Taylor’s original plan to prosecute up to four hundred individuals had to 
be revised to 177. 
 h e wish—and decision—to try individual industrialists in this changing 
landscape may seem contradictory at i rst glance. It is less so when we contrast 
the idea of trying them with what actually happened in the trials and decisions, 
as I illustrate in the next section. Below the surface, a deeper US need can be dis-
cerned: the need to reassure American industrialists, perhaps counter-intuitively 
 through these trials , that production for the Korean and other, potentially  aggres-
sive , wars would not lead to their prosecution. 114 From this perspective, the 
Tribunals’ task was to distinguish culpable involvement with an evil regime from 
innocent ‘business’. 115 
 (IV)  h e Trials of the Industrialists: From Morality Play to 
 h éâtre De L’absurde 
 h e trials at the NMT were based on Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL10) of 
December 1945, which authorized each of the four German Occupation Zone 
Commanders to arrest suspected war criminals and to establish ‘appropriate tribu-
nals’ for their trial. 116 Of the trials carried out by the Allies and eventually also the 
German courts, 117 those of the US, which took place in the same Nuremberg court-
house as the IMT trial, are by far the best documented and most widely known. 
 110  Donald  Bloxham ,  Genocide, the World Wars, and the Unweaving of Europe ( Middlesex :  Vallentine, 
Mitchell and Co.,  2008 ),  149 . 
 111  Jackson Final Report, above n 109, 436.    112  JCS 1779, [10]. 
 113  Clay, above n 94, 252.    114  Dubois, above n 10, 21. 
 115  Dubois, above n 10, 20. See also, Jeßberger, ‘Die I.G. Farben vor Gericht’, above n 1; Jeßberger, 
‘On the Origins of individual criminal responsibility under international law for business activity: IG 
Farben on Trial’, above n 1. 
 116  Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL10), Article II 2, 20 December 1945, reprinted in Taylor, 
Final Report, above n 109, 250. 
 117  As per CCL10, Article III, the French, British and Soviet commanders granted German courts’ 
jurisdiction. 
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It is these trials that are now once again cropping up in the literature around busi-
ness and international criminal law, 118 and indeed in recent legal practice. 119 
 My task in this section is to show how the realignment of the geopolitical 
landscape and internal dynamics of the US state-capitalist trust manifested them-
selves directly in the trials and their aftermaths. Of the trials held at the NMT, 
this occurs most clearly in the  trials of the industrialists . Here, the recent realign-
ment manifests in four distinct, interrelated ways. First, the trials were marked 
by excessively conciliatory language employed by the judges towards, or about, 
the defendants. Second, facts and charges that were admitted by the defendants 
were considered ‘not proven’ or ignored by the judges, and third, the necessity and 
superior order defences were allowed to be used in ways specii cally contradicting 
the main IMT decision and CCL10. Apart from the liberal application of exculpa-
tory legal doctrines, the NMTs in the industrialists’ cases were generous in other 
areas. For example, the NMTs accepted the defendants’ ignorance regarding the 
plans for aggressive war and the fact of the Holocaust. Finally, these factors added 
up to the passing of very light sentences when compared to similar CCL10 con-
victions. Moreover, it was in the aftermath of the trials, in the extrajudicial review 
of sentences carried out by High Commissioner for Germany McCloy 120 and the 
reinstatement of many of the industrialists in their old positions, that capitalism’s 
victor’s justice was sealed. 
 As a general point, it can be said that the trials turned from a morality play into 
 théâtre de l’absurde .  h éâtre de l’absurde , a genre that emerged in the early post-war 
years, is characterized by a lack of formal structure or logical dialogue in the after-
math of a sudden loss of meaning or purpose. For example, Samuel Beckett’s 
 Waiting for Godot (1952) represents the impossibility of purposeful action and the 
paralysis of human aspiration. 121 Below, I give only some representative examples 
from the three industrialists’ trials, the  Flick case, 122  Farben 123 and  Krupp . 124 h ere 
are many more. 125 I have added some factual context to each of the examples so 
 118  See, eg,  K.R.  Jacobson ,  ‘Doing Business with the Devil: h e Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate 
Oi  cials whose Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity’ ,  Air Force 
Law Review ,  56 ( 2005 ),  167 ;  G.  Skinner ,  ‘Nuremberg’s Legacy Continues: h e Nuremberg Trials’ 
Inl uence on Human Rights Litigation in US Courts under the Alien Tort Statute’ ,  Albany Law 
Review ,  71 ( 2008 ),  321 . Many recent works on Nuremberg perpetuate incorrect or incomplete facts 
about the trials (Bush, above n 1, 1237). 
 119  See, eg, the Nuremberg Scholars Amicus brief in support of the petitioners in  Kiobel v Royal 
Dutch Petroleum , USSC 10-1491. 
 120  Under Military Ordinance No. 7 (which established the tribunals) Article XVII (a), the Military 
Governor was authorized to reduce, mitigate or otherwise alter (but not raise) a sentence passed by the 
tribunals. While General Clay reviewed and coni rmed sentences, his successor McCloy constituted a 
clemency board which would re-review sentences without involving or even informing the judges and 
prosecutors (see Maguire, above n 75, 166–8). 
 121  h e Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 1–2. 
 122  United States v Friedrich Flick et al ( Flick ), above n 51. 
 123  United States v Carl Krauch et al ( Farben ),  Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under CCL10 , Vol. VII. 
 124  United States v Alfried Krupp et al. ( Krupp ),  Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under CCL10 , Vol. IX. 
 125  G. Baars, ‘Law(yers) Congealing Capitalism:  On the (Im)possibility of Restraining Business 
in Conl ict through International Criminal Law’, Doctoral h esis (University College London, 
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as to illustrate the role the leaders of these companies were said to have played in 
WWII and the Holocaust. 
 (1)  Excessively conciliatory language 
 h roughout the three judgments, examples of the judges’ use of excessively con-
ciliatory language can be found, which stands in stark contrast with the language 
of the prosecution. h e i rst example here is from the  Flick case. Friedrich Flick 
and i ve other oi  cials of the Flick Concern were accused of participation in the 
deportation of thousands of foreigners including concentration camp inmates and 
prisoners of war to forced labour in inhuman conditions including in the Flick 
mines and plants; spoliation contrary to the Hague Conventions of property in 
occupied France and the Soviet Union; participation in the persecution of Jews 
in the pre-war years through securing Jewish industrial and mining properties in 
the ‘Aryanization’ process, and knowing participation (of defendants Flick and 
Steinbrinck) in SS atrocities through membership in the ‘Circle of Friends of 
Himmler’ (a select group of industrialists and SS oi  cers). 126 h e Flick group of 
enterprises included coal and iron mines, steel producing and fabricating plants. 
It was, at the time, the largest steel combine in Germany, rivalled in size only by 
Krupp AG. 127 Chief Prosecutor Telford Taylor opened this i rst industrialist case to 
be tried by the Americans with the nature of industry’s responsibility:
 What we are here concerned with is no mere technical form of participation in crime, or 
some more or less accidental i nancial assistance of the commission of crimes. h e really 
signii cant thing . . . is the fact that the defendants assisted the SS and the Nazi regime with 
their eyes open and their hearts attuned to the basic purposes which they were subsidising. 
h eir support was not merely i nancial. It was part of a i rm partnership between these 
defendants and the Nazi regime that continued from before the Nazi seizure of power to 
the last days of the h ird Reich. 128 
 h e i nal judgment in the  Flick case (and the other industrialists’ cases) stands in 
stark contrast to this indictment. On the count of participation in the SS crimes 
through membership of the Himmler Circle, Flick and Steinbrinck were found 
guilty. As one of its most absurd proposals, the Tribunal suggested, that rather than 
forming an active part of the deliberations about the upcoming aggressive war, the 
defendants may just have attended the Himmler Circle’s meetings for its ‘excellent 
dinner’. 129 
 Moreover, the Tribunal attempted to show how Flick and company—despite 
attending these regular dinners—had not had the required knowledge to render 
them guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in relation to the killings 
and other atrocities carried out in the Nazi extermination camps. It recounted how:
2012) includes detailed treatment of the  Ministries Case and  Pohl as well as the other zonal trials (at 
119–74). 
 126  Flick, above n 51, 3 (Indictment). 
 127  Flick, above n 51, 34 (Opening Statement for Prosecution).    128  Flick, above n 51, 104. 
 129  Flick, above n 51, 1218 (Judgment). 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice? 181
 [i] n 1936 [Himmler] took members of the Circle on an inspection trip to visit Dachau con-
centration camp which was under his charge. h ey were escorted through certain buildings 
including the kitchen where they tasted food. h ey saw nothing of the infamous atrocities 
perhaps already there begun. But Flick who was present got the impression that it was not 
a pleasant place. 130  
 Again, this section bears an excessively conciliatory tone, which here interferes 
with the i nding of knowledge with regards to the facts of the Holocaust, which 
had been deemed (including by the IMT) common knowledge among the German 
people at the time. 131 
 h e other ‘reconciliation’ that appears in the trials is that between German 
and US industry.  Farben  prosecutor Dubois had been instructed by the US War 
Department, before taking up his role, not to charge the  Farben defendants with 
aggressive war. 132 h e US Government feared DuPont and other US industrial-
ists’ reaction. However, Dubois went ahead with the charge. It is clear from their 
statements that the industrialists on trial were aware of criticism of the trials voiced 
by US business leaders in the media—in particular, since Farben had had close 
relationships with Standard Oil, this trial had been watched closely by the home 
public. 133 h e defendants were aware that the US in changed political times would 
come to rely on its own industrialists, evidenced in Krauch’s closing statement:
 When I heard the i nal plea of the prosecution yesterday, I often thought of my colleagues 
in the United States and in England and tried to imagine what these men would think, 
when they heard and read these attacks hurled at us by the prosecution. For after all, they, 
too, are scientists and engineers; they had similar problems. h ey, like us, were called upon 
by the state to perform certain duties. h at was true then, before the world war, and that is 
true now, as we know from information received from the United States. A citizen cannot 
evade the call of the state. He must submit and must obey. 134 
 Seemingly in agreement with Krauch, the Tribunal acquitted the defendants of the 
charge of conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, i nding that they had acted merely 
like ordinary citizens, who, although the majority of them supported the waging 
of war in some way, were not the ones who planned the war and led a nation. h e 
Tribunal placed itself in opposition to the IMT on the role of industrialists, hold-
ing that the  Farben defendants merely followed their leaders and of ered no contri-
bution to the war ef ort greater than any other normally productive enterprise. 135 
 Most controversially, the Tribunal stated ‘[w] e reach the conclusion that com-
mon knowledge of Hitler’s plans did not prevail in Germany, either with respect 
to a general plan to wage aggressive war, or with respect to specii c plans to attack 
 130  Flick, above n 51, 1218 (Judgment).    131  IMT Judgment, above n 64, 480. 
 132  Dubois, above n 8, 20.    133  Taylor, Final Report, above note 109, 79. 
 134  Farben , above n 123 1055 (Final Statements by the Defendants: Krauch). Krauch’s lawyer had 
also said, ‘I have to harp again on the old subject: that is, did not other countries and other peoples 
act in the same way? Replace IG by I.C.I. (Imperial Chemical Industries) for England, or du Pont for 
America, Montecatini for Italy, and at once the similarity will become clear to you’: at 921 (Closing 
Statements for Defendant Krauch). 
 135  Farben, above n 125, 1126. 
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individual countries’. 136 Here we can see another direct contradiction of the IMT, 
both regarding Germans’ general knowledge and the  Farben defendants’ specii c 
knowledge. 137 As briel y noted above, the IMT had detailed the planning and strat-
egy meetings of Himmler’s circle of Friends, of which  Farben  defendant Buetei sh 
had been a part (with Flick and Rasche, amongst others). 138 
 h e  Farben Tribunal played down the common interest between the industrial 
and political leaders. In support of the claim that the Farben leaders were well 
aware of, and perhaps more directly involved in planning the aggressive war for 
their own purposes, the prosecution had produced a letter in which Krauch argued 
for the takeover of neighbouring countries’ industries, ‘peaceably at i rst’:
 It is essential for Germany to strengthen its own war potential as well as that of its allies to 
such an extent that the coalition is equal to the ef orts of practically the rest of the world. 
h is can be achieved only by new, strong, and combined ef orts by all of the allies, and by 
expanding and improving the greater economic domain corresponding to the improved 
raw material basis of the coalition, peaceably at i rst, to the Balkans and Spain. 139 
 Contrast this with the Tribunal’s view:
 h e defendants may have been, as some of them undoubtedly were, alarmed at the acceler-
ated pace that armament was taking. Yet even Krauch, who participated in the Four Year 
Plan within the chemical i eld,  undoubtedly did not realise that, in addition to strengthen-
ing Germany, he was participating in making the nation ready for a planned attack of an 
aggressive nature. 140 
 Eventually the Tribunal concluded summarily on the further evidence submitted 
to it: ‘h is labour has led to the  dei nite conclusion that Krauch did not knowingly 
participate in the planning, preparation or initiation of an aggressive war.’ 141 If 
Krauch’s level of knowledge did not sui  ce to i nd him guilty, then DuPont and 
the other US industrialists could rest assured. 
 (2)  Facts and charges admitted considered not proven or ignored 
by the judges 
 One of the most absurd features of the trials was how certain facts and charges that 
were admitted in court by the defendants were considered ‘not proven’ or ignored 
by the judges. h e  Farben case was by far the most absurd case in this respect. 142 In 
this case the way facts and law are twisted, and the tone of the judges’ statements, 
almost give the impression that the judges believed themselves to be involuntary 
actors in a play. 143 h e judgment stands in stark contrast to evidence reported 
 136  Farben, above n 125, 1107.    137  See, eg, IMT Judgment, above 64, 480. 
 138  See also,  Farben , above n 123, 1200.    139  Farben, above n 123, 1116. 
 140   Farben , above n 123, Vol. VIII, 1114.    141  Farben, above n 123, 1117 (emphasis added). 
 142  For a sustained critique, see Dubois, above n 8, 338–56. 
 143  h is impression is raised in the private papers of Judge Hebert:  see, eg, Paul Hebert, ‘Draft 
Dissent’,  Nuremberg Trials Documents (1948), Louisiana State University Law Centre Digital 
Commons, < http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/nuremberg_docs/1 > (accessed 27 February 2013). 
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in the US Congress and presented during the trial. 144 Von Schnitzler’s extensive 
admissions made in interrogations 145 eventually ‘did not mean anything, not even 
against himself ’. 146 
 On the slave labour charge, only in the Auschwitz context did the Tribunal 
i nd some evidence of the  Farben defendants’ initiative, but the area of criminal 
liability was still constructed very narrowly. Having considered many potential 
locations for a new synthetic rubber plant, on the recommendation of defendant 
Ambros, the small Polish village of Oś wię cim was selected. 147 h is became the site 
for Farben’s main manufacturing plant, as well as for the Auschwitz concentration 
and extermination camp. Ambros visited the camp at Auschwitz in the winter of 
1941–2 in company with some thirty important visitors (perhaps the Himmler 
Circle), and ‘he saw no abuse of inmates and thought that the camp was well 
conducted’. 148 Once again, in the face of the overwhelming evidence presented at 
the IMT and NMT in relation to Auschwitz (including, for example, that as of 
the beginning of 1942 ‘the smell of death emanating from the crematorium would 
pucker the nose of anyone within half a mile’ 149 ), it appears odd for the judgment 
to adopt such description uncritically. 
 ‘Work-to-death labour’ 150 at Farben’s Auschwitz factory is described by the 
Tribunal in its judgment euphemistically as ‘[t] hose [workers] who became unable 
to work or who were not amenable to discipline were sent back to the Auschwitz 
concentration camp or, as was more often the case, to Birkenau for extermina-
tion in the gas chambers’. 151 Also, it is noted, ‘[t]he plant site was not entirely 
without inhumane incidents’. 152 Nevertheless the Tribunal adds, ‘[i]t is clear that 
Farben did not deliberately pursue or encourage inhumane policy with respect to 
the workers. In fact, some steps were taken by Farben to alleviate the situation. 
It  voluntarily and at its own expense provided hot soup for the workers on the site 
at noon’. 153 When utilizing free ‘work-to-death labour’, however, this appears lit-
tle like generosity and even less an exculpatory factor for the  Farben defendants. 
h e fact remained, as stated by the Tribunal, that ‘the labour for Auschwitz was 
procured through the Reich Labour Oi  ce at Farben’s request. Forced labour was 
used for a period of approximately three years, from 1942 until the end of the 
war’. 154 Only i ve of the twenty-four defendants were found guilty under count 
three. Dubois’ i nal comment on the Tribunal’s ‘greatest exaggeration’ in the case 
of defendant Ilgner was, ‘[t]he tribunal rewrote into innocence even the aggressive 
deeds he admitted, raising the clear implication that any society could be i lled 
with such men with no danger whatever to the peace of the world’. 155 As well as 
falling into the current category of absurdism, the Tribunal also alludes to the next 
 144  See, eg, Bernstein Farben Report, above n 7.    145  See Osterloh, above n 19, 75. 
 146  Farben Indictment, above n 123, 47–9; Dubois, above n 8, 339. 
 147  Farben , above n 123, 1180.    148  Farben , above n 123, 1181. 
 149  Dubois, above n 8, 341. 
 150  Dubois notes worker deaths amounted to over 50,000: Dubois, above n 8, 342. 
 151  Farben, above n 123, 1183.    152  Farben , above n 123, 1184. 
 153  Farben , above n 123, 1185 (emphasis added).    154  Farben , above n 123, 1185. 
 155  Dubois, above n 8, 355. 
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category, that of i nding the defendants had simply, innocently, been doing as they 
were told, or carrying on ‘business as usual’ in unusual circumstances. 
 (3)  Howling with the wolves: Necessity used as a defence contrary 
to Nuremberg principles 
 Flick described his ostensible agreement with Nazi ideology as self-protective 
‘howling with the wolves’. 156 h e Tribunal accepted the view that the defendants 
(except Flick and Weiss) acted under necessity, 157 forced by the ‘reign of terror’ 
employed by the Nazi regime:
 h e Reich, through its hordes of enforcement oi  cials and secret police, was always ‘pre-
sent’, ready to go into instant action and to mete out savage and immediate punishment 
against anyone doing anything that could be construed as obstructing or hindering the 
carrying out of governmental regulations or decrees. 158 
 h is blanket interpretation of necessity could well be used to excuse any crime 
committed under order or decree of the Nazis. h e  Flick judgment in this aspect 
stands in sharp contrast to other non-industrialist decisions of the NMT. 159 
 h e generous use of necessity as a complete defence in these cases appears to 
be aimed at circumventing the bar on use of the ‘superior orders’ defence as a 
fundamental principle at Nuremberg. 160 CCL10 states, ‘[t] he fact that any person 
acted pursuant to the order of his Government or of a superior does not free him 
from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation’. 161 At the 
IMT, ‘the true test [for such mitigation], which is found in varying degrees in the 
criminal law of most nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral 
choice was in fact possible’. 162  Farben defendant Schneider had told interrogators 
that no one in government forced Farben to build the factories at Auschwitz or 
to operate them. 163 h e rubber quota had been set by Krauch himself and Farben 
produced in excess of government requirements. 164 Yet, the Tribunal found ‘[t]here 
can be but little doubt that the dei ant refusal of a Farben executive to carry out 
the Reich production schedule or to use slave labour to achieve that end would 
 156  Telford  Taylor ,  ‘Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and International Law’ ,  International Conciliation , 
 450 ( 1949 ),  304 . 
 157  h e NMTs do not employ a uniform understanding of the concept of necessity, which is also 
at times used interchangeably with ‘duress’. For an overview, see,  E.  Van Sliedregt ,  h e Criminal 
Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law ( h e Hague :  TMC Asser 
Press  2003 ),  279–83 . 
 158  Flick , above n 51, 1200. 
 159  For example in the Einsatzgruppen case necessity was understood to require an ‘imminent, real 
and inevitable threat’ ( US v Ohlendorf et al .  VII Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , 91). 
 160  Nuremberg Charter, Article 8. See, for example IMT Judgment, above n 65: ‘Superior orders, 
even to a soldier, cannot be considered in mitigation where crimes as shocking and extensive have been 
committed consciously, ruthlessly and without military excuse or justii cation’: at 493 (in relation to 
Keitel). 
 161  CCL10, Article II4(b).    162  IMT Judgment, above n 64, 447. 
 163  Dubois, above n 8, 341.    164  Dubois, above n 8, 341. 
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have been treated as treasonous sabotage and would have resulted in prompt and 
drastic retaliation’. 165 
 In his dissent on the charges of slave labour, Judge Hebert disagreed with the 
necessity i nding in the strongest terms, concluding that Farben directors had initi-
ated rather than followed orders, and that Farben directors’ will coincided with the 
government. Hebert called the Tribunal’s i nding of a Nazi threat to Farben ‘pure 
speculation’. 166 
 In the  Krupp case we can see a remarkable variation of the IMT’s reasoning 
on economic imperialism. Here, the Prosecution did not argue that the  Krupp 
defendants were part of the ‘Nazi conspiracy’ in the meaning of the IMT decision, 
but that they had been part of a ‘ Krupp conspiracy ’. h is was a manifestation of 
something altogether bigger:
 Nazism was, after all, only the temporary political manifestation of certain ideas and atti-
tudes which long antedated Nazism, and which will not perish nearly so easily. In this case, 
we are at grips with something much older than Nazism; something which fused with 
Nazi ideas to produce the h ird Reich, but which has its own independent and pernicious 
vitality. 167 
 To ensure Krupp’s own continually increasing proi tability, it was said to have 
driven the state and military to colonial expansion. 168 Dismissing the charge, Judge 
Wilkins considered that Krupp’s expansionism since the 1920s merely meant 
Krupp had acted  in the i rm’s i nancial interest as behoves a businessman. 169 From 
the condemnation of the state-corporate economic imperialism in the IMT (see 
above) to this decision, it appears the NMT came full circle: Krupp’s ‘conspiracy’ 
was simply business as usual. 170 
 h e  Krupp Tribunal then considered the remaining spoliation and forced labour 
charges. h e Tribunal found, in contrast to the  Farben decision (above), in terms 
of  knowledge with regard to the Krupp i rm’s activities at Auschwitz that the per-
secution of Jews by the Nazis was ‘common knowledge not only in Germany but 
throughout the civilised world’ and that the i rm’s oi  cials, could not  not  have 
known. 171 
 165  Farben , above n 123, 1174. 
 166  Farben , above n 123, 1306 (Judge Hebert’s Dissenting Opinion on Count h ree of the 
Indictment). 
 167  See  Krupp, above n 124, 412 (Judge Wilkins’ Separate Opinion on Counts 1 and 4). 
 168  Kröll connects this with Max Weber’s ‘Wilhelminismus’:  ‘die Allianz zwischen Großindustrie 
und Pseudoaristokratie mit der Folge der Derationalisierung der deutschen Weltpolitik’:  F.  Kröll ,  Fall 
10: Der Krupp-Prozeß , in  G.  Ueberschär ,  Der Nationalsozialismus vor Gericht: die alliierten Prozesse 
gegen Kriegsverbrecher und Soldaten 1943–1952—Nazism up in court: the Allies’ trials against war crimi-
nals and soldiers from 1943 to 1952 , ( Frankfurt am Main :  Fischer Taschenbuch Verl,   1999 ) . 
 169  Krupp , above n 124, 412. See also, Taylor, above n 156, 309. 
 170  Likewise, the  Farben Tribunal considered that company a ‘simple prototype of “Western capital-
ism” ’: Dubois, above n 8, 355. 
 171  Krupp , above n 124, 1434. 
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 (4)  ‘Sentences light enough to please a chicken thief ’ 
 Compared to sentences in cases where similar facts were alleged and established, 
the industrialists in  Flick and  Farben  received, as Dubois put it in his comment on 
the  Farben judgement, ‘sentences light enough to please a chicken thief ’. 172 Flick 
was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, Steinbrinck to i ve, and Weiss to 
two-and-a-half, while the other three defendants were acquitted on all counts. 173 
In his report, Taylor calls the  Flick judgment ‘exceedingly (if not excessively) mod-
erate and conciliatory.’ 174 In the  Farben case, Krauch was sentenced to six years, 
Ambros to eight, and the others received sentences between one-and-a-half and 
eight years. Four were acquitted. h e defendant Ilgner was considered innocent 
even of the aggressive deeds he had admitted. 175 By comparison, in the  Justices 
case, that same week, four life sentences were imposed, and in the  Pohl case against 
the SS Economic and Administrative Oi  ce (who had handled the logistical and 
administrative side of slave labour) four death sentences were imposed, and no 
prison sentence below ten years with four of twenty or more. 176 Dubois surmises, 
‘no doubt [the  Farben  judges] were inl uenced somewhat by our foreign policy’. 177 
 h e comparatively heavy sentences in  Krupp ranged between six and twelve years 
for ten defendants, and three years for one, and included the forfeiture of Alfried 
Krupp’s real and personal property. 178 After the IMT’s ‘Krupp  snafu ’, Taylor had 
commented that ‘Alfried Krupp was a very lucky man, for, had he been named, he 
would almost certainly have been convicted and given a very stif  sentence by the 
International Military Tribunal’. 179 With this in mind, the Krupp defendants’ trial 
seems ‘amicable’ indeed. 180 
 h e NMT also convicted one banker, Rasche, the director of the Dresdner 
Bank, as part of the  Ministries case. 181 His trial also featured the four factors of the 
NMT  théâtre de l’absurde . 182 h e popular German conception of his role is encap-
sulated in the saying, ‘ Wer marschiert da hinter dem ersten Tank? Das ist Doktor 
Rasche von der Dresdner Bank .’ 183 
 h e NMT trials of the industrialists left both prosecutors and judges with much 
agonized soul-searching, evidenced in their writing on the matter. 184 According 
 172  Dubois, above n 8, 339.    173  Krupp , above n 124, 1223. 
 174  Taylor, above n 156, 187.    175  Dubois, above n 8, 355. 
 176  United States v Josef Altstoetter et al. ( Justice ) in  Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , Vol. III;  United States v Oswald Pohl et al. ( Pohl ) in  Trials 
of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , Vol. V. 
 177  Dubois, above n 8, 357.    178  Krupp , above n 124, 1450. 
 179  Taylor, above n 4, 94. 
 180  h is is the term used in Jeßberger, ‘Die I.G. Farben vor Gericht’, above n 1 and Jeßberger, ‘On 
the Origins of Individual Criminal Responsibility’, above n 1. 
 181  United States v Ernst Weizsaecker et al ( Ministries ) in  Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , Vol. XIV. 
 182  Heller comments on the ‘unprincipled lenience’ of the tribunal towards Rasche, based on his 
status as a private businessman (Heller, above n 22, 5, 288–9). 
 183  ‘Who is that marching behind the i rst tank? h at’s Dr Rasche of the Dresdner Bank’ (my trans-
lation). I am grateful to Fabian Schellhaas, PhD Candidate, Humboldt University Faculty of Law for 
this phrase. 
 184  See, generally, Taylor, above n 156; Dubois, above n 8; Sasuly, above n 104. 
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to Dubois, Judge Hebert had been writing a dissenting opinion on the Farben 
aggressive war charge up to the very last day, stating that ‘by the time we reached 
the end [of the trial] I felt that practically every sentence of the indictment had 
been proved many times over’. 185 According to Dubois, Hebert probably changed 
his mind about submitting his dissent out of fear of communism, considering the 
trend of events in 1948. 186 Taylor also considered the evidence against Farben, 
especially on the aggressive war charge, to have been the strongest of all the indus-
trialist trials. 187 In the opinion Hebert eventually i led, six months after the major-
ity judgment, he states:  ‘h e issues of fact are truly so close as to cause genuine 
concern as to whether or not justice has actually been done because the enormous 
and indispensable role these defendants were shown to have played in the building 
of the war machine which made Hitler’s aggression possible.’ 188 
 What I have tried to show in this section is how international criminal law was 
shaped and manipulated to produce outcomes that were materially desirable—
resulting in, at times, absurd contradictions. h e outcomes of the trials are not 
the result of some putative ‘autonomous’ legal process, but rather, follow the logic 
of capitalism and bear the imprint of the changing facts and relationships of the 
material base. Yet, the contradictions inherent in the fact that these trials took 
place at all, their outcomes, and salient details such as the fact that throughout 
their trial detention the accused’s companies were still running (with the help of 
powers of attorney and board meetings in prison cells) 189 were to give rise to some-
thing bigger, international criminal law’s ef ective deployment in the service of 
capitalism’s victor’s justice. 
 (V)  Aftermath: Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice 
 Elsewhere I  have compared the US trials to the little-known post-WWII trials 
on the Eastern front. Although the US and USSR governments had also stated 
that the Eastern front war had been a joint military-industrial war for markets 
and resources (again revealed in the documentation), 190 the International Military 
Tribunal in Tokyo omitted to indict any of the leaders of the Japanese  zaibatsu . 
While later Allied military trials of camp guards also revealed the extent of forced 
labour employed by the  zaibatsu , the US occupation authorities opted to aban-
don prosecution plans and instead to utilize the industrial elites (in a ‘shock 
doctrine’ economic reform programme) to mobilize against a Japanese turn to 
communism. 191 
 185  Dubois, above n 8, 347.    186  Dubois, above n 8, 355.    187  Taylor, above n 156, 314. 
 188  Farben , above n 123, 1212 (concurring opinion of Judge Hebert on charges of crimes against 
peace). 
 189  Dubois, above n 8, 37; Schanetzky, above n 30, 77. 
 190  See further Baars, above n 125, esp. Chapter 3B (175–210) and also generally,  Yuma  Totani , 
 Tokyo War Crimes Trial: h e Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II ( Cambridge, MA :  Harvard 
University Press,   2008 ). 
 191  Baars, above n 125, 175–210. 
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 In Germany, the other Allies also tried industrialists in their respective zones 
of occupation. Each of the Allies’ own political priorities i nds its rel ection in 
these trials. For France, for example, it was important to i nd a balance between 
a ‘business-friendly’ judgment and creating a precedent that would enable expro-
priation of business assets from those who had collaborated in the War. 192 h e 
Saar magnate Hermann Röchling and several associates were tried by the French 
military tribunal for, among others, participating in the war of aggression. 193 h eir 
indictment stated that:
 [i] f the ‘Directors of German Enterprises’ . . . plead that they only attached themselves to 
Hitler in order to oppose communism or ‘Social Democracy’, there exists no doubt that the 
profound reason for their attitude can be sought in their desire, long before the coming of 
national socialism, to extend their undertakings beyond the frontiers of the Reich. 194 
 Hermann Röchling was accused of,  inter alia , urging Hitler to invade the Balkans 
so as to appropriate the Balkan enterprises. 
 While convicted of waging aggressive war in the i rst instance, on appeal in 
1949, the Supreme Court of the French Military Government in the French Zone 
of Occupation 195 acquitted Hermann Röchling. According to the French court, 
the IMT had set the bar for this charge very high by acquitting Speer of this charge 
and holding that only those involved in policy-making and planning could be 
convicted. 196 h e  Röchling defendants’ sentences were signii cantly reduced in their 
appeal, 197 showing a softening of French attitudes also. 
 For the British, the main motivator for zonal trials was prosecuting those who 
had killed or otherwise harmed Allied nationals and British servicemen in par-
ticular. 198 Despite British unwillingness to try industrialists, 199 in a ‘minor, insig-
nii cant’ case, 200 Tesch and his colleagues, the suppliers of Zyklon B produced 
by Farben to the death camps, were tried. Two were sentenced to death, while a 
third defendant was later pardoned by Prime Minister Eden. 201 h e Brits also tried 
Professor Wittig of the Steinöl company, which had benei tted from camp labour 
supplied through Pohl’s oi  ce. While the Neuengamme camp inmates consisted 
almost entirely of Allied nationals and POWs, Wittig escaped a death sentence. 202 
h e British appeared to have tried these businessmen not as members of their 
class or professional group, but conversely, as part of a series of scapegoats for 
harm to British national interest. h e war crimes trials were unpopular with the 
 192  Bloxham, above n 73, 24. 
 193  h e Government Commissioner of the General Tribunal of the Military Government of the French 
Zone of Occupation in Germany v Hermann Roechling et al ( Roechling )  Trials of War Criminals before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , Vol. XIV 1062. 
 194  Roechling , 1062. 
 195  Under CCL10 each occupying authority was entitled to set its own rules of procedure for military 
trials. h e French—unlike the Americans—allowed defendants to appeal against conviction. 
 196  Roechling , above n 193, 1109–10.    197  Roechling , 1142–3. 
 198  Bloxham, above n 73, 106.    199  Bush, above n 1, 1134. 
 200  In re Tesch & Others ( Zyklon B Case ), British Mil. Ct. 1946, in 1 UN War Crimes Comm’n,  Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals , 93 (1947). 
 201  UK National Archives, File No. WO 235/283. 
 202  UK National Archives, File No. WO 235/283. 
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British establishment, for several reasons including widespread anti-semitic and 
anti-communist attitudes among the UK leadership. 203 
 For the Soviets, the zonal trials appeared to be about  Systemkritik , or an oppor-
tunity to publicly condemn capitalism (as the cause/source of fascism) and its 
amoral agents. Among the estimated 70,000–72,000 persons tried by the Soviets 
under CCL10 204 were the directors and functionaries of Töpf & Sohne, who sup-
plied ovens to Auschwitz and were sent to perform hard labour. 205 
 Lawyers like Dubois and Sasuly, and to a lesser extent Taylor, left Germany 
frustrated and enraged. 206 On coming home, the case they had been i ghting was 
now taboo. h e tables had turned, the capitalists emerged as victors and the pros-
ecutors became persecuted. Tellingly, Kuehne, in his i nal statement to the  Farben 
Tribunal, cited the  New York Herald Tribune of 4 October 1947, from a report on a 
speech held by the Secretary of Defence, Forrestal, as follows: ‘Mr. Forrestal denied 
that there was any historical validity for the Marxist theory according to which indus-
trialists desired war for the sake of material gains. Mr. Forrestal said that there was no 
group anywhere that was more in favour of peace than the industrialists’. 207 
 h e point on which the Allies had agreed before, and at the IMT, was now a 
‘Marxist theory’. 208 On their return to the US, several members of the American pros-
ecution team and OMGUS staf  were investigated for possible ‘bolshevist’ sympathies 
by McCarthy’s regime. 209 h e preface to the German edition of Sasuly’s book, states 
that this text, for political reasons, has not been available in the US for many years. 210 
h e legacy of this has been the ‘legal amnesia’ through which the industrialists’ trials 
were forgotten until relatively recently. 211 
 On 21 September 1949 John McCloy replaced General Clay as civilian supervisor 
(High Commissioner) of what was now the Federal Republic of West Germany. By 
September 1950, the US was at war with Korea. McCloy and Acheson strongly advo-
cated that West Germany be rearmed. 212 According to Maguire, ‘[o] nce it became 
 203  A.  Rogers ,  ‘War Crimes Trials Under the Royal Warrant: British Practice, 1945–1949’ ,  ICLQ ,  39 
( 1990 ),  780–800 . 
 204  A.  Hilger ,  ‘Die Gerechtigkeit nehme ihren Lauf? Die Bestrafung deutscher Kriegs- und 
Gewaltverbrecher in der Sowjetunion und der SBZ/DDR’ , in  N.  Frei (ed),  Transnationale 
Vergangenheitspolitik:  Der Umgang mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechern in Europa nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg ( Gottingen :  Wallstein Verlag,  2006 ),  191 . 
 205  ‘Protokolle des Todes’, ‘Verhörprotokolle der Auschwitz-Ingenieure Prüfer, Sander und Schultze’, 
 Der Spiegel , 47:40 (1993), 151–62, < http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13679718.html > 
(accessed 27 February 2013) and < http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13679727.html > (accessed 
27 February 2013). See also generally Hilger, above n 204. Hilger argues that the release of German 
prisoners in 1953–6 signii ed a breach with the Stalinist policy of collective punishment for Germany’s 
‘unjust war’ (at 245). 
 206  h is is evident in the tone and content of their post-war writing: Dubois, above n 8; Taylor, above 
n 156; Sasuly, above n 104. 
 207  Farben , above n 123, 1073 (Final Statements of Defendants: Keuhne). 
 208  US Senator William Langer called the industrialist cases part of a communist plot (Maguire, 
above n 75, 169). 
 209  See, eg, Bush, above n 1, 1232; Interview with Bernard Bernstein, above n 84. See also a letter by 
Telford Taylor to Philip Young (successor to McCarthy) demanding a note on Taylor’s i le l agging ‘unre-
solved question of loyalty’: Letter from Telford Taylor to Philip Young, ‘Telford Taylor Papers’, Arthur 
W. Diamond Law Library, Columbia University Law School, New York, NY, TTP-CLS: 10-0-3-45. 
 210  Sasuly, above n 104, 5.    211  Bush, above n 1, 1240.    212  Maguire, above n 75, 167–9. 
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oi  cial that West Germany would be rearmed, questions pertaining to the war crimi-
nals took on new signii cance as West German leaders from all political parties pointed 
to America’s paradoxical role as occupying ally’. 213 German industrialists united in 
reconstituted trade associations again began to exert their inl uence, including for 
the release of their colleagues. 214 US and German leaderships shaped two American 
policies vis-à-vis the war crimes convicts: a public one to defend the validity of con-
victions from German attack, and a private one aimed at releasing war criminals as 
quickly and quietly as possible. 215 On 31 January 1951 clemency boards constituted 
by McCloy carried out ‘extrajudicial’ re-reviews of sentences handed down by the 
Allied occupation courts. 216 McCloy commuted twenty-one death sentences, reduced 
the sentences of sixty-nine other individuals and released thirty-three other war crimi-
nals, including Alfried Krupp. h e  Flick and  Farben defendants had already been 
released or had completed their sentences by this point. 217 h is review greatly upset 
Taylor, who wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt in protest. Among the main problems Taylor 
found was that the clemency board based its decision on a reading of the judgments 
and hearing of i fty defence lawyers but not a review of the evidence nor hearing any-
one from the prosecution. 218 Moreover, the authority (or legality) of the reviews per se 
was questioned. 219 Similarly in the UK, ‘immediately on his return to Downing Street 
[in 1951] Churchill moved to release all remaining Germans’. 220 Wittig was released 
in 1955. 221 h e early releases are criticized as completely discrediting the original tri-
als 222 and ‘coni rm[ing] the failure of Nuremberg’. 223 Jeßberger writes (specii cally 
about the IG Farben managers—but this could apply to the industrialists in general), 
‘[the industrialists] had a soft fall, from the ranks of the Wehrmacht into the warm 
bosom of the Western powers’. 224 
 So, while ‘[t] he masses of peoples liberated from the yoke of fascism demanded 
the trial of the most evil cartel leaders, in Nuremberg’, 225 even those who had 
received sentences were soon to be freed again, and by 1952 many were already 
 213  Maguire, above n 75, 168.    214  Schanetzky, above n 30, 80. 
 215  Maguire, above n 75, 162. 
 216  ‘Landsberg: A Documentary Report’,  Information Bulletin , Oi  ce of the US High Commissioner 
for Germany Oi  ce of Public Af airs, Public Relations Division, APO 757, US Army, February 1951, 
2–8, 55–67. 
 217  ‘Landsberg: A Documentary Report’, above n 216, 6. For Clay’s original review and coni rmation, 
see  Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 , 
Vol. XV, 1144–5; Taylor, Final Report, above n 109, 95–7; Heller, above n 22, 332. 
 218  Letter to Eleanor Roosevelt dated 19 June 1951, ‘Telford Taylor Papers’, Arthur W. Diamond 
Law Library, Columbia University Law School, New York, NY, TTP-CLS: 14-4-3-53 (Taylor Letter 
to Roosevelt). 
 219  Heller, above n 22, 356–8.    220  Bloxham, above n 73, 116. 
 221  UK National Archives, WO 235/283.    222  Taylor Letter to Roosevelt, above n 218. 
 223  Maguire, above n 75, 178. ‘Instead of discussing the shocking atrocities committed by many of 
the high-ranking convicts, American oi  cials were forced to defend the basic legal legitimacy of the 
trials’: at 207. 
 224  Jeßberger, ‘On the Origins of Individual Criminal Responsibility’ above n 1, 802. 
 225  IG Farben:  Mächtiger und Gefährlicher denn je, Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus and der 
Technischen Hochschule für Chemie Leuna-Merseburg, 1960. 
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back in power at their companies. 226 Indeed, the IG Farben ‘parts’ BASF, Bayer, and 
Hoechst quickly became leading companies in their sector. 227 h ese soon began to 
produce military materials again which were used by the US in their war against 
Korea. 228 Further, former manufacturer of German military uniforms Neckermann 
became a fashion mail-order giant, symbolizing the rising consumer culture, while 
the former Reich ambassador to Italy became CEO of the Coca Cola Germany, 
a symbol of US–German reconciliation. 229 While German industry was rebuilt, 
the Cold War deepened, the UN, the European Coal and Steel Community, the 
General Agreement on Tarif s and Trade regime and the Bretton Woods institu-
tions took shape. 230 From this perspective, Nuremberg was not a failure. Rather, by 
producing capitalism’s victor’s justice it played an important part in this process of 
further congealing capitalism and institutionalizing international law. 231 
 (VI)  Conclusion 
 A qualitative change came out of the contradictions of Nuremberg:  the way in 
which the war was understood had altered. h e ‘economic case’ all but disappeared 
from the mainstream narrative of WWII, which today focuses almost entirely 
on what Frei calls the ‘Hitler-factor’. 232 h e ‘economic case’, once central to the 
Nuremberg prosecution, while persisting in the German Democratic Republic and 
Soviet literature, is now described as propaganda by Western scholars. 233 
 International criminal law was born out of the great contradictions that existed 
in the aftermath of WWII. Its potential as a powerful way of shaping narratives—
highlighting some relations and ‘spiriting away’ others; concealing what must 
remain hidden—was soon realized. h rough Nuremberg, international criminal 
law as ‘commodii ed morality’ 234 helped spirit away the material causes at the base 
of WWII. At the same time, something fundamental had changed on the ground 
in Europe, where economic actors came to be seen as essentially peaceful, and 
where economic development became synonymous with peace. 235 Combined, 
these two moves cemented capitalism’s victor’s justice, functioning as a means of 
 226  Along with almost all other members of ‘Hitler’s elite’:  Norbert  Frei (ed),  Hitlers Eliten nach 1945 
( Munich :   Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag,  2003 ) , esp. T. Schanetzky, ‘Unternehmer: Proi teure des 
Unrechts’ (at 87). 
 227  Schanetzky, above n 30, 87. 
 228  IG Farben: Macht und Verbrechen: Ein auf exaktem Material beruhender Beitrag zur nationalen 
Frage in Deutschland un dem Weg zu ihrer Lösung, Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus and der 
Technischen Hochschule für Chemie Leuna-Merseburg, 1962. 
 229  Schanetzky, above n 30, 88. 
 230  In an ironic turn, McCloy was appointed to lead the World Bank (Bush, above n 1, 1193). 
 231  Grietje  Baars ,  ‘h e Making of an International Criminal Law’ , in  Christine  Schwöbel (ed.)  Critical 
Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction , ( Oxford :  Routledge , forthcoming,  2014 ) . 
 232  Generally, Frei, above n 18. 
 233  Frei, above n 18, front inside jacket and 10; Osterloh, above n 20, 37. 
 234  Baars, above n 125. 
 235  See, for example,  h omas  Friedman’s  ‘Golden Arches h eory of Conl ict Prevention’ , in  h e Lexus 
and h e Olive Tree ( New York, NY :  Anchor Books,   2000 ) . 
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creating a narrative that hides the economic story of conl ict, and constructs what 
we would now call corporate impunity. 
 Post-Cold War and the global spread of capitalism, renewed impetus for inter-
national cooperation in the sphere of international criminal law, has not led to the 
application of that law to war’s economic actors. Instead, international criminal 
law continues to draw our focus to individual deviancy rather than conl ict pro-
duced by the mode of production, hiding economic grounds behind nationalist, 
racial, religious, etc explanations. 236 Elsewhere I have employed Pashukanis’ ‘com-
modity form theory of law’ 237 to argue that law’s function reaches beyond mere 
capitalist instrumentalism and is, by virtue of its form, an essential element of the 
capitalist mode of production. 238 h us, rather than suggesting ‘corporate account-
ability in ICL’ is a real possibility, 239 the hidden history of Nuremberg may give us 
cause to investigate more deeply exactly how and why international criminal law 
constructs  de facto ‘corporate impunity’ as a necessary ingredient of today’s capital-
ist imperialism. 
 
 236  For a discussion of this ef ect in the context of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, 
and Rwanda see Baars, above n 125, 255–85. Bukharin also makes this point: Bukharin, above n 3, 
117–18: ‘[h e theory that war comes out of “the struggle of races”] is assiduously cultivated both in 
the press and in the universities, for the sole reason that it promises no mean advantages for Master 
Capital’: at 118. 
 237  Pashukanis, above n 2, and  China  Miéville ,  Between Equal Rights: A Marxist h eory of International 
Law ( London :  Pluto Press,   2006 ) . 
 238  Baars, above n 125;  Grietje  Baars ,  ‘Reform or Revolution?’ Polanyian v Marxian Perspectives on 
the Regulation of “h e Economic” ’ ,  Northern Ireland Law Quarterly ,  62 ( 2011 ),  415–31 . 
 239  As some contemporary authors on Nuremberg do, see, for example, Bush, above n 1. 
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